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Has UNCTAD made a difference to the world
commodity economy? Can it make a difference in the
future, and if so how? The facile and even cynical
answer to the first question is that the activities of
UNCTAD have made no difference to the fundamental
operation of the international commodity markets
and industries and to the solution of their problems.
There is, of course, some basis for that answer. As is
well known, UNCTAD's efforts since 1975 have
focused on the Integrated Programme on Commodities
and, within it, more specifically on price stabilisation
proposals involving the setting up to joint consumer-
producer buffer stocks backed by a Common Fund,
also to be jointly financed -and administered by
industrialised and Third World countries. To be sure,
Resolution 93(1V) adopted in May 1976 at UNCTAD
IV in Nairobi included references to other important
elements of commodity policy: expansion of pro-
cessing of primary products in developing countries,
diversification of exports, stabilisation of export
earnings through compensatory finance. But it was the
price stabilisation scheme that caught the imagination
of Third World policy-makers and analysts; this was
the time when they were vicariously experiencing the
success of the oil producers in dictating terms to the
market, and with the Common Fund appearing
potentially as a new international financial institution
with more of a Third World presence than the World
Bank or the International Monetary Fund, the overall
promise was one of increased participation of the
Third World in the structure of political and economic
power at the world level. At the same time, the
stabilisation objective attracted development-minded
sectors in the industrialised countries.
It is understandable, therefore, both that the price
stabilisation component of the Programme became
the focal one and that high hopes of a relatively speedy
implementation followed the adoption of Resolution
93(1V). But events have turned out quite differently.
In the nearly 10 years since the Programme was first
put forward only one new commodity agreement of
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the kind that is at the heart of the Programme has been
concluded, the International Natural Rubber Agree-
ment, which came into force in April 1982.1 Two other
new agreements - on jute and tropical timber - are
concerned only with exchange of information,
consultation and promotion of uses, and do not
include price stabilisation objectives [Wasserman
1983, 1984].
Moreover, some of the agreements that were in
existence before UNCTAD IV have since faced
difficulties and are arguably weaker today than they
were then. Thus, the Sixth International Tin
Agreement which was to have entered into force
definitively on 1 July 1982 failed to achieve the
required level of acceptance among producers and
consumers (80 per cent of production and con-
sumption), and could not even gain provisional entry
into force automatically as it had not been accepted by
governments representing 65 per cent of consumption.
In the event, the governments that had ratified the
agreement decided to bring it into operation
provisionally among themselves on 1 July 1982. The
level of acceptance went up later to reach 82 per cent of
production and 51 per cent of consumption, but the
largest consumer, the US, and the fourth largest
exporter, Bolivia, opted out of the Agreement
[UNCTAD 1983a]. In cocoa, the market intervention
powers of the Agreement were suspended indefinitely
in 1983, and the negotiations for a new agreement to
come into force in September 1984 have run into
serious difficulties, not least because of the refusal of
the largest producer, the Ivory Coast, to take part [The
Guardian, 26 March 1984].
The International Sugar Organisation proved unable
to face the dramatic decline in the price of sugar that
started in 1982, thus casting doubt on the adequacy of
the agreement to fulfil its role in the world market
[UNCTAD 1983a; Smith 1983]. Finally, the Common
Fund, that was to be the cornerstone of the
The text of the Agreement is contained in UNCTAD 1979. See also
Wasserman 1980 and Stubbs 984.
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stabilisation scheme was only agreed in a highly
diluted form in June 1980, and since then it has not
entered into force because of the failure to gather the
required number of ratifications [UNCTAD 1983e].
Thus, judged against the original expectations the
results seem little short of dismal. But that indeed
would be too facile an assessment. While the large
number of commodity agreements envisaged by the
Programme have not materialised, it is hard to deny
that the Programme has had an impact on the world
commodity economy and more generally on inter-
national economic relations. The new rubber
agreement has, on the whole, been successful in
implementing price stabilisation; this does not
preclude complaints by the producers that the floor
price is too conservative and that they are therefore
trading off stability for low prices [Stubbs 1984]. The
Common Fund, although not operational, represents
the beginning of a new international organisation that
may have a profound influence on world commodity
markets. More generally, the idea that the international
commodity economy has structural problems and that
these must be tackled through purposive intervention
on the part of the world community has slowly gained
some degree of acceptance at the international level,
although clearly the extent to which the governments
of the industrialised countries of the West have
accepted the notion varies considerably: in particular,
the United States has reaffirmed its preference for a
non-interventionist policy for the international
community in the commodities field [Helman 1981].
This, of course, contrasts oddly with the formidable
array of instruments of intervention in the internal
commodity markets displayed by the US, notably in
minerals; they include stockpiling, tariffs, quotas,
subsidies. etc.2
The balance sheet, therefore, is mixed. There is no
doubt, however, that the high expectations that
accompanied the launching of the Integrated
Programme in 1976 have not been realised. In a sense,
the fifth session of UNCTAD in Manila in 1980
recognised the fact that the market intervention
approach to commodity policy was coming to a
standstill, and shifted the emphasis towards the notion
of commodity development and processing. This, as
indicated, was already present in the Integrated
Programme, but it was only with Resolution 124 (V)
that it was put at the centre of the commodity debate.
It was a path, however, that was itself not exempt from
serious pitfalls; while a series of valuable studies by the
UNCTAD Secretariat on the marketing and processing
of various commodities has been produced, no
lt has in fact been argued that the relaiive stability of the world tin
market is due less to ihe International Tin Agreement than to ihe
Intervention of the US General Services Administration strategic
stockpile transactions [Smith and Schink 1979].
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significant progress has been made up to now in
implementing the recommendations.3
In the meantime, of course, the commodity problem
had not gone away, and by the time preparations
began for the sixth session of UNCTAD, to take place
in Belgrade in June 1983, there had been a veritable
collapse in the prices of primary commodities, which
had reached their lowest level for 30 years by 1981, and
whose level of instability remained high [UNCTAD
1983b].
In this context, the UNCTAD Secretariat put forward
a series of proposals for consideration at UNCTAD
VI, including action aimed at speeding up the entry
into operation of the Integrated Programme by calling
on governments to ratify the Common Fund
agreement and to renew efforts to complete new
commodity agreements; an immediate action pro-
gramme involving the negotiation ofa series of interim
agreements with a view to maintaining prices above
198 1-82 levels; and an expansion and liberalisation of
the IMF compensatory financing facility. Proposed
longer term measures included compensatory financing
for shortfalls in commodity export earnings, improving
market access, and expanding and developing the
processing of primary commodities in the producing
countries [UNCTAD 1983e]. The debate in Belgrade
was long and difficult, and the resulting resolutions,
while reaffirming the support of the organisation for
the Integrated Programme for Commodities,
amounted solely to a mandate to carry out studies on
the feasibility of the proposals made by the Secretariat
[UNCTAD l983d].
The reasons why the preceding initiatives on
international commodity policy have not borne the
hoped for fruit have been the subject of some debate
among both analysts and officials. While there is
discussion on the extent to which the price
stabilisation proposals are feasible from an economic
viewpoint,4 most observers seem to agree that the
failure in the implementation of the programme is due
to political reasons. But there the agreement ends.
Official UNCTAD documents and a number of
outside observers resort to the notion ofpolitical will'
to explain the problem. This is helpful up to a point, in
that it highlights the importance of ideologies and
perceptions of decision-makers in the final outcome of
negotiations and the extent to which dynamic
leadership by some member countries can be
instrumental in achieving consensus and progress. It is
not helpful, however, if it is taken to mean that
The studies dealt with cocoa, bauxite, manganese, hard libres.
phosphaies, coffee, copper, jute, sugar and tea. For a coniparatisc
summary of conclusions see UNCTAD 1982.
For a carefully balanced view see Behrman and Tinakorn-
Ramangkura 1978.
governments are entirely free agents who can decide at
will which course of action to take in the international
arena. 'Political will' in this sense becomes a black box
within which further investigation is ruled out. This
might be understandable in official documents, which
must adhere to the notion that governments are
unified representatives of the national will and which
have to tread warily on the territory of sensitive
political analysis. But an adequate examination of the
reasons for the difficulties of the Integrated
Programme must go beyond the concept of 'political
will' and ask what constellations of concrete interests,
groups and political factors determine the positions of
governments in the negotiating arena. To what extent
is the rejection by some of the industrialised countries
of the West of the idea of organised intervention by the
international community a reflection of the views of
transnational corporations? What specific political
pressures within the developing countries explain the
reluctance of many of them to embark on the
implementation of the Programme?
In a number of cases, the lack of success of
negotiations concerning commodity agreements has
indeed been due in part to the reluctance of producer
developing countries to commit themselves to a price
stabilisation scheme. Thus, in the case of copper -
regarded by many as the most likely commodity for
the setting up of an international commodity
agreement - an important factor in stopping progress
was the fact that the largest Third World producer
(and the current largest world producer) Chile, was
more concerned with taking advantage of its
competitive cost position to dispute markets to other
Third World producers than in cooperating in the
setting up of a copper agreement [Fortin forthcoming].
By contrast, the success in achieving a natural rubber
agreement is largely to be attributed to the extent to
which natural rubber producers were united in their
determination to bring the agreement into being. As a
recent assessment puts it:
Why were the [International Natural Rubber
Agreement] negotiations successful? The key here
was that the producers were united and had in place
the [Association of Natural Rubber Producing
Countries] agreement to which they could return if
the UNCTAD-sponsored negotiations failed. The
producers were few in number, they had a well-
prepared position, they controlled over 90 per cent
of world exports and they had a political cohesion
based on their common membership in the regional
grouping of ASEAN [Stubbs 1984:30].
This heightened the political motivations of the
United States and Japan to do something for the
region in the form of participating in the Agreement.
Exploring the real determinants of the behaviour of
governments in negotiations is no doubt a major item
in any serious reassessment of international com-
modity policy and its difficulties, which in turn is a
prerequisite for the formulation of alternative
proposals for the future.
A particularly important question in connection with
Third World producers is the true extent to which
price stabilisation is regarded as a priority objective.
Clearly, in a situation in which the price level is
extremely depressed, Third World producers are more
concerned with arrangements that would guarantee a
minimum price rather than with smoothing out
fluctuations per se. The introduction of realistic floor
prices, to be implemented through export quotas and
stock management - whether national or inter-
national - might be a considerably more attractive
proposition for hard-pressed Third World producing
countries; for consumer countries the attraction
would be that prices of commodities would remain at
levels that would guarantee investment and adequate
supplies for the future. This, again, was a strong
determinant of the participation of the consuming
countries in the natural rubber agreement [Stubbs
1984].
Also, price instability is a problem for producer
countries only insofar as it generates instability of
foreign exchange earnings; the latter, however, is to a
substantial degree caused not by fluctuations in price
but by fluctuations in volume of exports. Given
realistic targets for reduction of price instability, the
net impact on the stability of earnings of even
successful price stabilisation schemes might be
modest, and the point is probably not lost among
Third World producer governments.
More generally, the time has come to ask seriously,
what is the impact on international commodity policy
of changes in the structure of commodity industries
and markets whose effects are beginning to be felt now
and will continue to intensify in the medium and long
run? Perhaps the most important of those changes
have to do, on the one hand, with the pattern of world
demand and consumption for primary commodities
and on the other with the pattern of output and
exports of the producer countries. In the first area, it
seems clear that demand for primary commodities in
the industrial markets is stagnating and thereby falling
in relative importance in total world demand. This is
probably due to changes in the relative importance of
natural raw materials in the process of economic
reproduction of advanced economies, resulting from
technological progress, demographic changes, the
stabilisation of consumption patterns and the
increasing importance of the tertiary sector in the
generation of total demand. This is, of course, a long
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term trend, but one whose effects are already being
felt. Thus, work recently carried out at the Institute of
Development Studies in Sussex has identified the
declining level of metal intensity in the economies of
the EEC countries - a phenomenon which is also
common to the US and to a lesser extent to Japan - as
one of the central elements in the current and future
state of the market for base metals; the forecast is a
pattern of oversupply in the medium and long run
which in most cases will prevent prices from going
back in real terms to those prevailing in the early 1970s
[Daniel 1984].
In a sense, this raises questions about the fundamental
assumptions of the Integrated Programme. The
Programme is an attempt at managing the relation-
ships between developing producing countries and
developed consumer countries in a context of
underlying long term stability of supply and demand;
the price stabilisation proposals aim precisely at
smoothing out short term fluctuations. By contrast, if
the preceding assessment of trends in the demand for
primary commodities in the industrialised countries is
correct, this highlights the need for the developing
producer countries to direct their attention to the
potential markets in other developing countries rather
than in the developed economies. UNCTAD is already
engaged in work on the possibilities of expansion of
South-South trade, but the work could - and should
- be linked more closely to primary commodities and
commodity policy.
South-South relations are also relevant to the question
of increased processing of primary commodities in the
developing countries. So far, proposals in this
direction have met with opposition from firms and
companies in the industrialised countries which are
engaged in processing and related activities. This is a
major factor in explaining the already mentioned lack
of progress in reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers in
the industrialised countries which discriminate against
the export of processed commodities by developing
countries. But there have also been problems with
Third World consumer countries which want
processing to take place within their own national
frontiers. The question, of course, is not only one of
location but of ownership and control. An effort at
redirection of commodity trade within the South must
deal from the beginning and systematically with these
issues. It would be a way of giving concrete meaning to
the concept of collective self-reliance which is now
generally accepted - at least at the level of rhetoric
among Third World countries.
There is a second structural trend that needs attention
if a reformulation of international commodity policy
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is to take place. It is that the process of diversification
of the economies of a number of developing countries
is increasing the importance of manufactured exports
at the expense of that of primary commodity exports.
This has already led to situations in which the largest
Third World exporters of a given commodity have
nonetheless a relatively minor interest in it, since it
represents a small part of their exports. If the trend is
to continue in the future, this raises difficult questions
about the mobilisation of political consensus in the
Third World towards the reform of the international
commodity economy: the Third World countries with
the greatest interest in reform might turn out to be
those with the least economic leverage to bring it
about. Also, the differences in approach between
commodity producer and consumer countries in the
Third World are becoming increasingly visible, a point
that is also applicable to the countries of the
COMECON. Further research on these trends seems
to be a prerequisite for a reformulation of
international commodity policy proposals.
Lastly, the evolution of the world commodity
economy in relation to the international economy as a
whole has underlined the importance of systematically
exploring the interdependence of the various com-
ponents of international economic and political
relations. In particular, a serious reappraisal of
international commodity policy must take on board
the linkages between commodity markets and
industries and the world financial markets and
arrangements.
We can now come back to the second of our initial
questions. UNCTAD can make a difference to the
international commodity economy, and will probably
be called upon to make an increasing difference as the
structural problems of commodity markets and
industries become apparent. In order to make that
contribution, however, UNCTAD must initiate a
fundamental reexamination of international com-
modity policy and its assumptions, including some of
the aspects highlighted above. This will allow the
identification of the elements of the Integrated
Programme that can be rescued and on which renewed
efforts should be placed. Some elements of the
research agenda might not be suitable for exploration
by UNCTAD itself; in such cases UNCTAD's work
should link up with, and support, work carried out
elsewhere that is less subject to political and
diplomatic sensitivities. In its 20th year of life,
UNCTAD could through such an initiative re-enact
the catalytic role that UNCTAD I had in 1964 in
generating creative thinking in the search for
cooperative solutions to the problems of the world
economy and of the developing world.
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